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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 In this appeal, we confront Tri-M Group, LLC‟s (“Tri-
M”) challenge to the constitutionality of Delaware‟s 
regulatory scheme for the training and compensation of 
3 
 
apprentices on construction projects.  In the District Court, 
Tri-M sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 
against enforcement of the Delaware Prevailing Wage 
Regulations (“DPWR”), 19-1000-1322 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 
1 et seq. (2010), and the Rules and Regulations Relating to 
Delaware Apprenticeship and Training Law (“ATRR”), 19-
1000-1101 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 1.0 et seq. (2010), alleging 
that the regulations discriminated against Tri-M and other 
out-of-state contractors in violation of the negative – or 
dormant – Commerce Clause.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment to Tri-M, concluding that Delaware‟s 
refusal to recognize out-of-state registered apprentices 
facially discriminated against out-of-state contractors without 
advancing a legitimate state interest, and this appeal followed.  
See Tri-M Group, LLC v. Sharp, 705 F. Supp. 2d 335 (D. Del. 
2010).  We agree and will affirm. 
Background & Procedural History 
 
The facts of the underlying suit are undisputed.  In 
response to passage of the National Apprentice Act 
(“Fitzgerald Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 50 et seq., Delaware enacted 
an apprentice regulatory scheme to “develop and conduct 
employee training and registered apprenticeship programs,” 
and to provide “for the establishment and furtherance of 
standards of apprenticeship and training to safeguard the 
welfare of apprentices and trainees.”  19 DEL. C. § 201.1  The 
                                              
1
 Pursuant to the implementing regulations, a federal Bureau 
of Apprenticeship and Training may delegate authority to 
state apprenticeship agencies to register and supervise 
apprenticeship programs within the state, and may 
promulgate apprenticeship laws and regulations pertaining to 
4 
 
Delaware Prevailing Wage Law (“PWL”), 29 DEL. C. § 6960 
et seq.,
2
 provides that, for certain public works projects at 
least partially funded by the State, mechanics and laborers – 
including apprentices – shall be paid a prevailing wage set by 
the Delaware Department of Labor (“DDOL”).3  The 
implementing Delaware Prevailing Wage Regulations 
(“DPWR”) define mechanics and laborers as “those workers 
                                                                                                     
the registration of apprenticeship programs.  See 29 C.F.R. § 
29. 
 
2
 The PWL states: 
The specifications for every contract or 
aggregate of contracts relating to a public 
works project in excess of $100,000 for new 
construction . . . or $15,000 for alteration, 
repair, renovation, rehabilitation, demolition 
or reconstruction . . . to which this State or 
any subdivision thereof is a party and for 
which the State appropriated any part of the 
funds and which requires or involves the 
employment of mechanics and/or laborers 
shall contain a provision stating the 
minimum wages to be paid various classes 
of laborers and mechanics which shall be 
based upon the wages that will be 
determined by the Delaware Department of 
Labor, to be prevailing in the county in 
which the work is to be performed. 
29 DEL. C. § 6960(a). 
 
3
 DDOL is charged with administering and enforcing the 
Delaware Prevailing Wage Law.  See 19 DEL. C. § 105(a)(1). 
5 
 
whose duties are manual or physical in nature, as 
distinguished from mental or managerial.”  19-1000-1322 
DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1.3.  Although apprentices are 
included within the definition of a mechanic, the regulations 
distinguish between the two, and define apprentices as 
“persons who are indentured and employed in a bona fide 
apprenticeship program and individually registered by the 
program sponsor with the [DDOL].”  Id. §§ 3.1.3 & 3.1.4.1.1.  
The regulations further provide a detailed schedule of the 
“minimum wage progression” for registered apprentices, and 
establish that employers must pay apprentices a fraction of 
the wages earned by mechanics.
4
  19-1000-1101 DEL. ADMIN. 
CODE §§ 6.2.6 & 6.2.7.  The apprentice rate depends on the 
length of the project and the apprentice‟s progression, but is 
always a percentage of the mechanic‟s rate.5 
 
Pursuant to the regulations, only a contractor that has 
registered its apprenticeship program in Delaware is eligible 
                                              
4
 The terms “mechanic” and “journeyman” are used 
interchangeably in the Delaware laws and regulations.  For 
consistency, we utilize the term “mechanic” throughout this 
opinion. 
 
5
 The applicable regulation provides that in a 2000-hour 
apprenticeship program, the minimum apprentice rate is 40% 
of the mechanic‟s rate for the first 1,000 hours, and 85% for 
the second 1,000 hours.  In an 8,000-hour program, the 
minimum apprentice rate is 40% for the first 1,000 hours, and 
increases at 1,000-hour increments thereafter, with the final 
period corresponding to 85% of the mechanic‟s rate.  19-
1000-1101 DEL. ADMIN. CODE. § 6.2.7. 
6 
 
to pay the lower apprentice wage rate to registered 
apprentices.  To qualify, a contractor 
must be a “Delaware Resident Contractor” or 
hold and maintain a “Delaware Resident 
Business License.”  The Registrant or Sponsor 
must hold and maintain a permanent place of 
business, not to include site trailers or other 
facilities serving only one contract or related 
set of contracts.  To be eligible to be a 
Registrant or Sponsor, Employer/Business . . . 
must have the training program and an 
adequate number of Journeypersons to meet 
the ratio requirements as stated for that 
particular apprenticeable occupation. 
 
19-1000-1101 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1.
6
  Under this rubric, 
an out-of-state contractor cannot sponsor an apprentice 
program without setting up and maintaining a permanent 
office location within Delaware.
7
  Failure to abide by these 
conditions may result in financial penalties and bar an 
                                              
6
 A “Delaware Resident Contractor” “includes any general 
contractor . . . [or] subcontractor . . . who regularly maintains 
a place of business in Delaware.  Regularly maintaining a 
place of business in Delaware does not include site trailers, 
temporary structures associated with one contract or set of 
related contracts. . . .”  19-1000-1101 DEL. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 3.1 
 
7
 Prior to 1999, the pertinent Delaware regulations did not 
include a permanent place of business requirement, and Tri-M 
was a Delaware-registered sponsor with all of the benefits 
pertaining thereto.   
7 
 
employer judicially determined to have violated the PWL 
from bidding on public construction contracts for three years.  
See 29 DEL. C. § 6960(e).  In this way, the Delaware 
regulations permit in-state contractors on public works 
projects to pay a reduced apprentice rate to their Delaware-
registered apprentices, while requiring out-of-state 
contractors to pay the higher mechanic‟s rate to their non-
Delaware-registered apprentices.
8
 
 
Appellee Tri-M is a Pennsylvania-based electrical 
contracting company that successfully bid on a sub-contract 
for electrical and building automation work at the Delaware 
State Veterans Home (“the Project”) in Milford, Delaware, 
which was funded in part by Delaware state funds.
9
  Tri-M 
began work on the Project in August 2005, employing 
Pennsylvania-registered apprentices and fully-trained 
mechanic professionals, but paid its employees pursuant to 
the wage rates described in the DDOL prevailing wage 
determination for their respective classifications.   
 
                                              
8
 The prevailing wage rate schedules periodically published 
by DDOL explicitly state that “non-registered apprentices 
must be paid the mechanic‟s rate.”  (See Appellant‟s Opening 
Br. at 9; App‟x at 366.) 
 
9
 Tri-M maintains an apprenticeship program that is 
registered with the Pennsylvania Apprenticeship and Training 
Council of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and 
Industry (“PATC”), and its apprentice electricians are 
Pennsylvania-registered apprentices, individually registered 
with PATC pursuant to individual apprenticeship agreements. 
8 
 
On March 26, 2009, a DDOL Labor Law Enforcement 
Officer conducted an on-site inspection of the Project site.  
The officer subsequently informed Tri-M that the DDOL had 
opened a case to verify Tri-M‟s compliance with the PWL, 
and requested and timely received Tri-M‟s daily logs and 
sworn payroll reports for employees working on the Project.  
He also confirmed with the Delaware Apprenticeship and 
Training Department that Tri-M did not have an apprentice 
program registered in Delaware.  This necessarily meant that 
Tri-M‟s apprentices were not Delaware-registered 
apprentices.  Tri-M‟s CFO inquired about registering Tri-M‟s 
apprentices in Delaware, but was informed that Delaware 
requires an apprentice program sponsor to maintain a 
permanent place of business in Delaware.
10
 
 
Tri-M‟s records indicated that it paid its Pennsylvania-
registered apprentices the Delaware-registered apprentice 
rate, rather than the mechanic‟s rate applicable to non-
Delaware-registered apprentices.  As a result, DDOL 
informed Tri-M that it was in violation of the PWL and 
DPWR for failing to pay the applicable higher prevailing 
wage rates.  Tri-M was thus required to conduct a self-audit 
and pay any wage deficiencies to the Pennsylvania-registered 
apprentices who incorrectly received the lower apprentice 
rate, instead of the higher mechanic‟s rate.  Tri-M provided 
DDOL with documentation regarding its self-audit, including 
the amounts needed to bring each employee‟s pay up to the 
mechanic‟s prevailing wage rate, and timely reimbursed the 
                                              
10
 Although Tri-M worked and maintained a site trailer in 
Delaware for many years at the AstraZeneca facility in 
Wilmington, this presence did not satisfy the residency 
requirement.  See 19-1000-1101 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1. 
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six Pennsylvania-registered apprentices working on the 
Project who were not recognized as apprentices under 
Delaware law.
11
   
 
Subsequently, Tri-M brought an action for declaratory 
and injunctive relief against then-Secretary of the Delaware 
Department of Labor Thomas Sharp, alleging that DDOL 
discriminated against Tri-M and other out-of-state contractors 
by refusing to recognize their out-of-state registered 
apprentices for purposes of the PWL and DPWR.  At the 
conclusion of discovery, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to Tri-M, and this appeal followed. 
 
DDOL raises three primary arguments on appeal.  
First, DDOL contends that the State‟s challenged 
procurement scheme – including the permanent place of 
business requirement – does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, and is, therefore, not violative of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  Second, DDOL posits that the 
contested apprentice program regulations were explicitly 
authorized by Congress and approved by the United States 
Department of Labor, thus negating any conflict with the 
Commerce Clause.  Finally, DDOL argues, for the first time 
on appeal, that even assuming arguendo that the challenged 
regulatory scheme is discriminatory, its attachment of 
prevailing wage conditions to State-funded public works 
contracts constitutes participation in the private market and 
does not run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.   
 
                                              
11
 The DDOL ultimately determined  that although Tri-M had 
initially violated the PWL and DPWR, the subsequent 
reimbursement brought Tri-M into compliance with the rules.   
10 
 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court exercised federal subject matter 
jurisdiction over Tri-M‟s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1331.  Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. ' 1291 over 
the State‟s appeal of the District Court=s grant of summary 
judgment to Tri-M.  We exercise plenary review of a district 
court‟s order granting or denying summary judgment, 
applying the same standard as the district court:  “Summary 
Judgment is appropriate only where, drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Ruehl v. Viacom, 
Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
and citation omitted). 
 
Discussion 
 
 We are asked to decide whether Delaware‟s 
differentiated prevailing wage regulations interfere with 
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.  
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  We cannot reach this 
question, however, without first resolving DDOL‟s 
contention that the imposition of prevailing wage conditions 
upon out-of-state contractors constituted permissible market 
participation by the State within the bounds of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  This is so because “courts treat the 
question of whether the state is acting as a market participant 
as a threshold question for dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis.”  United Healthcare Ins. Co. v. Davis, 602 F.3d 618, 
624 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing White v. Mass. Council of Const. 
Employ., Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 210 (1983)).  “Impact on out-of-
state residents figures in the equation only after it is decided 
11 
 
that the city is regulating the market rather than participating 
in it, for only in the former case need it be determined 
whether any burden on interstate commerce is permitted by 
the Commerce Clause.”  White, 460 U.S. at 210 (emphasis 
added); see also Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 355 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (“Before applying the dormant Commerce Clause 
to State activities that burden or discriminate against 
interstate commerce, a court must determine whether the 
State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market 
regulator.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted; 
emphasis in original); J.F. Shea Co., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 
992 F.2d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The impact of the local 
business preference on out-of-state residents figures into the 
analysis only after it is decided that the City is regulating the 
market rather than participating in it,” and appellant cannot 
“jump[ ] to the second aspect of dormant commerce clause 
analysis without clearing the first hurdle”) (emphasis in 
original).  Accordingly, we would customarily assess whether 
the market participant exception applies to Delaware‟s 
regulatory scheme before deciding if the allegedly 
discriminatory rules improperly burden interstate commerce.  
See generally Atl. Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. 
of Chosen Freeholders of Atl. Cnty., 48 F.3d 701, 717 (3d Cir. 
1995) (examining burden on interstate commerce after 
finding that city rules were promulgated “in its role as a 
market regulator” and are “not immune from review under the 
Commerce Clause”). 
 
In deciding this threshold question, however, we must 
first confront a preliminary issue, namely, whether DDOL 
can avail itself of the market participant exception, having 
failed to argue to the District Court that the exception should 
12 
 
apply.
12
  It is axiomatic that “„arguments asserted for the first 
time on appeal are deemed to be waived and consequently are 
not susceptible to review in this Court absent exceptional 
circumstances.‟”  United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 
202 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Rose, 538 
F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2008)).  “This general rule serves 
several important judicial interests, protect[ing] litigants from 
unfair surprise; promot[ing] the finality of judgments and 
conserv[ing] judicial resources; and preventing district courts 
from being reversed on grounds that were never urged or 
argued before [them].”  Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 
F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted; alterations in original). 
 
Nonetheless, we will still address arguments raised for 
the first time on appeal  in “exceptional circumstances,” and 
note that “„the matter of what questions may be taken up and 
resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to 
the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the 
facts of individual cases.‟”  Council of Alter. Pol. Parties v. 
Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976)); see also Selected Risks Ins. 
Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that 
waiver rule “is one of discretion rather than jurisdiction”).  
Indeed, the waiver principle “is only a rule of practice and 
may be relaxed whenever the public interest or justice so 
warrants.”  Franki Found. Co. v. Alger-Rau & Assoc., Inc., 
                                              
12
 Before the District Court, DDOL urged that Congress had 
explicitly authorized the contested apprentice regulations, 
and, presumably, contemplated that no real dormant 
Commerce Clause issue actually existed.  The District Court 
did not accept this argument. 
13 
 
513 F.2d 581, 586 (3d Cir. 1975); See also Barefoot 
Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 121698, at *10 
(3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2011) (same); Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 
617, 620 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977) (same).
13
   
 
We think the “public interest” weighs heavily toward 
our consideration of the market participant issue.  
Specifically, the District Court‟s decision calls into doubt the 
constitutionality of the Delaware regulatory scheme, as well 
as the public works procurement laws of approximately 37 
other states.
14
  The market participant doctrine impacts the 
labor and wage conditions attendant to every public works 
contract in Delaware, and invites legal challenges to the 
procurement schemes of every similarly-situated state.  As 
DDOL suggests, this legal dispute entails crucial and 
unresolved issues of state sovereignty and state procurement 
                                              
13
 See also United States v. Anthony Dell’Aquilla, Enters. & 
Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that 
new issues raised on appeal may warrant review “when the 
public interest requires that the issue be heard or when 
manifest injustice would result from the failure to consider 
the new issue[s]”) (citation and quotations omitted; alteration 
in original). 
 
14
 We respectfully disagree with our concurring colleague‟s 
characterization of this appeal as merely involving “$10,000 
in wages Tri-M paid to six apprentices who worked on a 
[completed] state-sponsored construction project.”  Con. Op. 
at 1.   
 
14 
 
spending, and tests the limits of the dormant Commerce 
Clause in this field.
15
 
 
Moreover, the nature of the precise issue raised fits 
within the category of “exceptional circumstances” 
warranting our consideration.  As we noted above, in our 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the alleged burden 
on interstate commerce is generally evaluated “only after” it 
is decided that a state is regulating, rather than participating, 
in a market.  White, 460 U.S. at 210.  The market participant 
determination is a “threshold question for dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis,” Davis, 602 F.3d at 624, because “the 
strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause are not activated 
unless a state action may be characterized as a „regulation,‟” 
SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 
1995).  Accordingly, a court should not turn a blind eye to the 
fact that a state cannot be held to have improperly 
discriminated against interstate commerce – as was found in 
                                              
15
 Most recently, we found the fact that “we have not yet 
addressed the issue raised” to itself constitute “an institutional 
consideration that can be viewed as „an exceptional 
circumstance‟” under the “public interest” prong of the 
analysis.  United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 202 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (reviewing a rare procedural posture whereby a 
jury charge was offered by the trial court, but refused by the 
defendant) (emphasis added).  Despite the importance and 
novelty of the issues implicated by the market participant 
doctrine, our last decision in the field was issued in 1995.  
Under Petersen, this itself constitutes an “institutional 
consideration” warranting timely review. 
 
15 
 
this case – if it was behaving as a market participant, rather 
than a market regulator.   
 
We have previously stated that an argument omitted 
before the district court may nevertheless be considered 
where it “is closely related to arguments that [the parties] did 
raise in that court.”  Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Most recently, we declined to apply the waiver 
rule formalistically where a party neglected to adequately 
press a claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A 
before the district court, having urged instead an unsuccessful 
argument based on the related § 766.
16
  Bunge, -- F.3d --, 
2011 WL 121698, at *10.  Noting the interrelated nature of 
the separate sections, we excused the defendant‟s invocation 
of “the wrong definition of the tort,” and decided the § 766A 
issue.  Id.  Similarly here, we cannot conclude that the 
intertwined market participant aspect of the dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis was waived in a manner that 
precludes us from ascertaining whether the regulations at 
issue constitute permissible market participation or 
unconstitutional discrimination. 
 
Moreover, as in Bunge, from a public policy 
standpoint, we think “[t]he public interest is better served by 
                                              
16
 Both sections address the tort of intentional interference 
with another‟s performance of a contract, but § 766A lacks as 
an element the requirement of a failure to perform; as a result, 
§ 776A favored the appellant in Bunge, whereas § 766 did 
not.  2011 WL 121698, at *9.  We relaxed the waiver rule and 
found the new argument under § 766A determinative to the 
resolution of the issue in appellant‟s favor requiring reversal, 
unlike here, where we are affirming the District Court. 
16 
 
addressing [this issue] than by ignoring it.”  Id.  In its most 
recent decision concerning the dormant Commerce Clause, 
the Supreme Court observed that it granted certiorari to 
address a legal decision that “cast[ ] constitutional doubt on a 
tax regime adopted by a majority of the States,” finding the 
matter “raised [ ] an important question of constitutional 
law.”  Dep’t of Rev. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337 (2008).  
Similarly, the instant appeal “casts constitutional doubt” upon 
a state procurement scheme “adopted by a majority of the 
States,” and presents a weighty question of public concern. 
 
Furthermore, application of waiver is not compelled by 
the primary prudential aims of the waiver rule.  “The waiver 
rule applies with greatest force „where the timely raising of 
the issue would have permitted the parties to develop a 
factual record.‟”  Id. (citation omitted).  Accordingly, “we 
have been reluctant to apply the waiver doctrine when only an 
issue of law is raised” and no additional fact-finding is 
necessary.  Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006); 
see also Hooks, 179 F.3d at 69 (exercising discretion to 
address a new argument where the “issue involved . . . 
concerns a pure question of law, and in the interest of 
avoiding further delay”).  “The waiver rule serves two 
purposes: ensuring that the necessary evidentiary 
development occurs in the trial court, and preventing surprise 
to the parties when a case is decided on some basis on which 
they have not presented argument.”  Bunge, -- F.3d --, 2011 
WL 121698, at *10.   
 
Neither party disputes the District Court‟s factual 
findings, nor does either party suggest that further 
development of the record at the District Court level would 
assist resolution of this matter.  Therefore, we are confronted 
17 
 
solely with a pure question of law as to the applicability of 
the market participant exception.
17
  See Huber, 469 F.3d at 75 
(“[W]e are less inclined to find a waiver when the parties 
have had the opportunity to offer all the relevant evidence.”).  
Furthermore, the litigants were afforded ample opportunity to 
present and develop their legal theories and arguments on the 
issue, obviating any plausible claim of unfair surprise or 
prejudice.
18
 
 
Finally, the judicial interests highlighted by Webb as 
further justification for the general waiver principle are not 
undermined by our decision to consider the market participant 
exception here.  See supra.  Specifically, by resolving this 
purely legal question without further unnecessary proceedings 
before the district court, we will “conserve judicial 
resources.”  Additionally, because we adopt the District 
Court‟s dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and are not 
basing our decision on the market participant exception as 
such, we are not ruling “on grounds that were never urged or 
argued.”  Id. 
 
                                              
17
 In the dormant Commerce Clause context specifically, we 
previously declined a request to remand a government 
agency‟s new arguments to the district court because “the 
facts [were] not in dispute” and the “public interest [was] 
sufficiently implicated [ ] to require resolution” of the new 
issues.  Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Com’n v. Pena, 126 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
18
 Notably, Tri-M does not actually assert in its briefing that 
our resolution of the market participant question would be 
prejudicial or unfair. 
18 
 
At bottom, because the parties have fully developed 
their arguments on appeal and this aspect of the dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge before us sufficiently implicates 
the public interest, it is appropriate for us to resolve whether 
the market participant exception applies. 
 
I.  Market Participant Exception 
 
 Accordingly, we will first address DDOL‟s claim that 
in regulating the prevailing wages and imposing the 
permanent place of business requirement, Delaware acted as a 
mere participant in the market. 
 
A. 
 
 The Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution grants Congress plenary authority to regulate 
commerce among the states, and “has long been understood 
to have a „negative‟ aspect that denies the States the power 
unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate 
flow of articles of commerce.”  Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).  Where 
a state restriction discriminates against interstate commerce 
by providing “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens 
the latter,” it is virtually per se invalid in all but the narrowest 
circumstances.  Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) 
(quoting Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99).  Pursuant to negative 
or dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a discriminatory 
state law “will survive only if it „advances a legitimate local 
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.‟”  Davis, 553 U.S. at 338 
(quoting Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 101).   
19 
 
 
“Some cases run a different course, however, and an 
exception covers States that go beyond regulation and 
themselves „participat[e] in the market.‟”  Id. at 339 (quoting 
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)) 
(alterations in original).  “Nothing in the purposes animating 
the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of 
congressional action, from participating in the market and 
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”  
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810; see also Atl. Coast, 48 
F.3d at 715 (recognizing “exception from the restraints of the 
dormant Commerce Clause for otherwise discriminatory 
action taken by a governmental entity in its role as a market 
participant”).  Therefore, “when a state or local government 
enters the market as a participant it is not subject to the 
restraints of the Commerce Clause,” and our “single inquiry” 
is limited to ascertaining “„whether the challenged program 
constituted direct state participation in the market.‟”  White, 
460 U.S. at 208 (quoting Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 436 
n.7).
19
 
 
In practice, the Supreme Court has found a state or 
municipality to act as a market participant where “the 
government was participating directly in some aspect of the 
market as a purchaser, seller, or producer, and the alleged 
                                              
19
 The Court further emphasized that since “state proprietary 
activities may be, and often are, burdened with the same 
restrictions imposed on private market participants,” 
“[e]venhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, 
States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal 
constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce 
Clause.”  White, 460 U.S. at 207 n.3. 
20 
 
discriminatory effects on the interstate market flowed from 
these market actions.”  Atl. Coast, 48 F.3d at 716.  The 
exception was initially described in Alexandria Scrap.  426 
U.S. at 797.  There, the Supreme Court upheld a Maryland 
statute that, in an effort to remove abandoned automobiles 
from the State‟s roads, promised a cash “bounty” to scrap 
processors licensed by the state for the destruction of any 
vehicle previously titled in Maryland, while denying a similar 
payment to out-of-state processors.  Id. at 797, 801.  The 
Court found that Maryland had “entered into the market itself 
to bid up the[ ] price . . . as a purchaser,” and was a market 
participant behaving as a private actor.  Id. at 809.  Several 
years later, the Court reaffirmed the distinction between 
market participant and market regulator in Reeves, Inc. v. 
Stake, sustaining South Dakota‟s decision to confine sales of 
cement by a state-owned and -operated cement plant to state 
residents during a cement shortage.  447 U.S. 429, 431-32, 
438 (1980) (emphasizing that a state conducting business as a 
private actor may “exercise [its] own independent discretion 
as to parties with whom [it] will deal,” and may preference 
in-state interests.)   
 
Similarly, in White, the Supreme Court again applied 
the market participant exception in upholding a mayor‟s 
executive order that required every construction project 
funded in part by city funds to be performed by a work force 
of at least 50% city residents.  460 U.S. at 205, 208.  The 
Court observed that the city participated in the market by 
“expend[ing] its own funds in entering into construction 
contracts for public projects,” but cautioned that “some limits 
on a state or local government‟s ability to impose restrictions 
that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the 
government transacts business” must exist.  Id. at 211.  The 
21 
 
Court declined to define those limits, however, because 
“everyone affected by the order [was], in a substantial if 
informal sense, working for the city.‟”  Id. at 214-15 (internal 
citations omitted).
20
 
 
Our own jurisprudence reflects limited opportunity to 
opine regarding the exception.  In Swin Resources Systems, 
Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa., we upheld a county‟s decision 
to charge a preferential rate for reception and disposal of 
waste generated within the county as compared to waste 
generated outside the vicinity.  883 F.2d 245, 246 (3d Cir. 
1989).  Analogizing to Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White, 
we noted that the pricing scheme did not affect prices outside 
the direct transactions and reflected permissible restrictions 
by a market participant upon those it dealt with directly in the 
marketplace.  Id.  The subsequent year, in Trojan 
Technologies v. Pennsylvania, we approved a State 
procurement law that required all political subdivisions to 
purchase only American-made steel products.  916 F.2d 903, 
904-05 (3d Cir. 1990).  We noted that, “[a]s the ultimately 
controlling public purchaser, the Commonwealth enjoys the 
same right to specify to its suppliers the source of steel to be 
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 The Supreme Court declined to extend the doctrine, 
however, in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, finding that an Alaska statute conditioning the sale 
of state timber to private purchasers upon agreement to 
process the timber within the State represented impermissible 
“downstream regulation.”  467 U.S. 82, 98-99.  The Court 
observed that “although the State may be a participant in the 
timber market, it is using its leverage in that market to exert a 
regulatory effect in the processing market, in which it is not a 
participant.”  Id. 
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used in any supplies provided as is enjoyed by similarly 
situated private purchasers.”  Id. 
 
We declined to apply the market participant exception, 
however, to a state law that permitted state agencies to 
establish solid waste districts that controlled the flow of all 
waste within the district to designated disposal facilities 
within and outside the district and state.  Atl. Coast, 48 F.3d 
at 706-07.  We determined that the disposal site designation 
criteria extended beyond private participation, and, in fact, 
controlled the conduct of private parties in the market: 
 
When a public entity participates in a market, it 
may sell and buy what it chooses, to or from 
whom it chooses, on terms of its choice; its 
market participation does not, however, confer 
upon it the right to use its regulatory power to 
control the actions of others in that market. 
 
Id. at 717.  Because the regulations did not “merely determine 
the manner or conditions under which the government will 
provide a service, [and] require[d] all participants in the 
market to purchase the government service,” the state‟s 
conduct did not fall within the market participant exception.
21
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 Several of our fellow Courts of Appeals have likewise 
found the market participant exception inapplicable in 
comparable instances where a municipality‟s participation in 
a market effected concurrent regulation of private parties in 
that market.  See, e.g. Waste Mgmt. Holdgs., Inc. v. Gilmore, 
252 F.3d 316, 345 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that Virginia “was 
not acting as a private participant in the waste disposal 
market” by regulating the conduct of others in that market) 
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Id.; see also United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 438 F.3d 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“[I]t is well settled that a state may act as a market 
participant with respect to one portion of a program while 
operating as a market regulator in implementing another.”) 
(citing USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1283). 
 
 More recently, we had occasion to consider the 
“regulator/market-participant distinction” in the context of 
federal preemption under the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., where a municipality 
conditioned financing upon the borrower‟s agreement to a 
labor neutrality agreement.  Hotel Empls. & Rest. Empls. 
Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 
215 (3d Cir. 2004).
22
  There, we observed that “whether a 
                                                                                                     
(citation omitted); USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 
66 F.3d 1272, 1282 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[S]tates and local 
governments do not enjoy carte blanche to regulate a market 
simply because they also participate in that market.”). 
 
22
 Although this line of cases involves preemption analysis 
under the NLRA and other federal statutes, the Supreme 
Court‟s discussion of the market participant exception in this 
context relies upon and conforms with its dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, and is instructive.  See, e.g., Engine 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. So. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 
1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (“After the development of the 
market participant doctrine in [ ] dormant Commerce Clause 
cases, the Supreme Court . . . [has] applied the doctrine to 
protect proprietary state action from preemption by various 
federal statutes.”); Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. 
City of Bedford, Tx., 180 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1999) 
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government‟s condition of funding constitutes market 
participation . . . depends upon the following two step test:  
First, does the challenged funding condition serve to advance 
or preserve the state‟s proprietary interest in a project or 
transaction, as an investor, owner, or financier?  Second, is 
the scope of the funding condition „specifically tailored‟ to 
the proprietary interest?”  Id. at 215-16 (citing Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council v. Assoc. Builders & Contr. of 
Mass./R.I., Inc. (“Boston Harbor”), 507 U.S. 218, 232 
(1993)).
23
  We emphasized that the “mere fact that 
                                                                                                     
(noting that the market participant exception originating in 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis “has been recognized in 
preemption cases”); Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of 
New York, No. 08 Civ. 7837, 2008 WL 4866021, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2008) (“The market participant doctrine is 
an extension of a principle from the Commerce Clause . . . 
and has been extended to preemption jurisprudence”) (citing 
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810). 
 
23
 In Boston Harbor, the Supreme Court found that the NLRA 
did not preempt a bid specification by a Massachusetts 
agency requiring bidders to abide by a certain labor 
agreement because the government was acting as a market 
participant, rather than regulating labor-management 
relations.  507 U.S. at 229 (explaining that preemption 
doctrines apply only to state regulation).  The Court 
emphasized that the cleanup project targeted by the relevant 
specification constituted market participation since it was 
“specifically tailored to one particular job” to ensure “an 
efficient project that would be completed as quickly and 
effectively as possible at the lowest cost.”  Id.  In effect, the 
state was acting “with no interest in setting policy.”  Id. 
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government affects labor relations by imposing conditions 
under its power to procure or to spend does not automatically 
mean that the state is acting in a propriety capacity” as a 
market participant.  Id. at 213.  Finding that the city‟s 
insistence upon a no-strike agreement did not “sweep[ ] more 
broadly than [ ] a government agency‟s proprietary economic 
interest,” we concluded that the funding condition was 
“specifically tailored to protect its proprietary interest in the 
value” of the implicated property, and was narrowly tailored 
only to projects receiving the funds.  Id. at 217-18. 
 
Notably, this reasoning squares with the Supreme 
Court‟s most recent pronouncement in the field.  In Chamber 
of Commerce of the U.S.A. v. Brown, the Supreme Court 
declined to find market participation in the preemption 
context where a California statute imposing a targeted 
negative restriction on employer speech was neither 
“„specifically tailored to one particular job,‟ nor a „legitimate 
response to state procurement constraints or to local 
economic needs.‟”  554 U.S. 60, 70 (2008) (quoting Wisc. 
Dep’t of Ind., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 
U.S. 282, 291 (1986)).  Where the “legislative purpose is not 
the efficient procurement of goods and services, but the 
furtherance of a labor policy,” a state actor is behaving “in its 
capacity as a regulator rather than a market participant.”  Id.  
  
B. 
 
From the foregoing, we can glean several questions a 
court should ask when conducting the “single inquiry” of 
determining “whether the challenged program constitute[s] 
direct state participation in the market,” or market regulation.  
White, 460 U.S. at 208.  Is the regulation limited to a job or 
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contract in which a governmental entity is engaged?  Is the 
action designed merely to protect or advance a specific 
proprietary interest?  Is it tailored to that interest?  Does the 
government‟s involvement affect only those with whom the 
entity is dealing in the market, or does it impact others or set 
broad policies?  In reaching the answer, the Court “must 
consider in each specific context if the government is acting 
like a private business or a governmental entity.”24  Selevan v. 
N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 93 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 
Here, DDOL urges that Delaware‟s attachment of its 
prevailing wage conditions to State-funded public works 
contracts is analogous to a private party‟s attaching labor 
conditions to private market transactions, and that the State‟s 
desire to advance policy interests does not preclude the 
application of the market participant doctrine.  Were this an 
accurate characterization of the state‟s conduct – i.e., merely 
attaching conditions to private market transactions – we 
would agree.  But it is not.  There is nothing in the regulations 
that could be deemed tailored or targeted to a specific 
proprietary interest; the conditions do not attach to a specific 
job or contract in which the government is engaged.  To the 
contrary, unlike the factual circumstances considered by the 
Supreme Court in Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White, and 
by our own Court in Swin and Trojan, the disputed prevailing 
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 In this regard, we observed in Swin that “application of the 
distinction between „market participant‟ and „market 
regulator‟ has [ ] occasioned considerable dispute in the 
Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence,” with the “author of each of 
the three opinions that applied the doctrine [Hughes, White, 
and Reeves] . . . author[ing] a dissent in the next.”  883 F.2d 
at 249. 
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wage conditions here are part of an expansive regulatory 
scheme that controls the market activities of private 
participants; this involvement clearly reflects a governmental 
interest in setting labor policy, rather than merely impacting 
the state‟s own participation in the market. 
 
As an initial matter, the apprenticeship regulations 
sweep broadly.  They are not limited in scope only to 
contracts in which the state directly participates in a funding 
or procurement capacity.  As DDOL conceded in its briefing 
and at oral argument, the ATRR do not refer exclusively to 
public contracts, and they actually regulate Delaware-resident 
sponsors in the private contractual market for labor.  (See 
Appellant‟s Reply Br. at 22.)  Specifically, once a contractor 
becomes a Delaware-registered apprenticeship program 
sponsor, it must adhere to the apprentice prevailing wage 
rates and training requirements regardless of whether the 
contractor is thereafter performing labor on a public or private 
contract.  (Id. at 22-23; Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 29-30.)  In 
this context, DDOL expressly conceded that it was 
“regulating apprentice labor (rather than acting as a market 
participant).”  (Appellant‟s Reply Br. at 22-23.)   
This admission followed DDOL‟s earlier concession 
before the District Court that DDOL‟s ability to monitor and 
inspect apprenticeship program resident sponsors – through 
on-site visits – and to enforce the apprenticeship wage and 
training requirements was “not limited to public works 
projects,” and could potentially extend to private projects 
outside Delaware.
25
  (See Sharp‟s Opening Br. in Support of 
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 Under this rubric, if, as the Delaware rules currently 
provide, an out-of-state contractor establishes a permanent 
place of business and becomes a registered sponsor in order 
28 
 
Mot. for Sum. Judg. at 22.)  In this regard, “the funding 
condition [is not] „specifically tailored‟ to the proprietary 
interest,” and Delaware is not so much participating in the 
market as it is regulating the market as a whole.  Hotel 
Empls., 390 F.3d at 215. 
 
In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456 (1992), 
the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute that required all 
Oklahoma electricity plants to use at least 10% Oklahoma 
coal.  Although the Court acknowledged that the state was 
participating in the market by purchasing coal for its own 
plant, the Court found the market participant exception 
inapplicable because the law also regulated the purchasing 
behavior of private plants.  Id.; see also SSC Corp. v. Town of 
Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502, 513 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing 
Wyoming, and noting that “simply because Oklahoma was in 
one respect a „participant‟ in the coal market did not mean 
that in all respects its activity affecting the coal market 
constituted „market participation‟”) (emphasis in original).  
As in Wyoming, while DDOL may at times participate in the 
market by directly procuring labor for public works projects, 
it also regulates the apprentice wages and apprenticeship 
                                                                                                     
to compete on a level playing field with Delaware 
contractors, the out-of-state contractor would become subject 
to all of DDOL‟s regulations, including the prevailing wage 
regulations governing compensation and training of 
apprentices in private contracts.  Therefore, unless the out-of-
state contractor is willing to establish a permanent place of 
business solely to service public works contracts and then to 
exit Delaware to bid on private contracts, the existing rules 
would also regulate the private contracts entered into by out-
of-state contractors regardless of their situs. 
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programs implemented by registered sponsors regardless of 
whether such sponsors are performing on private contracts 
devoid of the State‟s direct involvement as a “purchaser, 
seller, or producer.”  See Atl. Coast, 48 F.3d at 717.  In this 
respect, the prevailing wage conditions at issue exceed the 
bounds of the State‟s direct participation and affect the 
purchasing behavior of private parties.  As such, the 
regulatory scheme “confer[s] upon [DDOL] the right to use 
its regulatory power to control the actions of others in [the] 
market,” and “w[as] thus promulgated by [Delaware] in its 
role as a market regulator, not in its capacity as a market 
participant.”  Id.     
 
The expansive scope of Delaware‟s regulations also 
distinguishes the case before us from the previously discussed 
market participation cases, and, in particular, from White, the 
broadest of the decisions.  “The city order at issue in White 
included the workforce restriction in the city‟s notice for bids, 
so the contracting company was aware of the condition if it 
decided to bid and could elect not to participate in a sale 
under that requirement.”  GSW, Inc. v. Long County, Ga., 999 
F.2d 1508, 1515 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing White, 460 U.S. 
at 206).  In this respect, the city was operating much like a 
private entity in providing specific conditions within 
individual bid proposals.  By contrast, the Delaware PWL and 
ATRR are untethered from any specific spending or 
procurement project, and apply not just to public works 
contracts; they also dictate the wage and employment terms 
of a registered sponsor‟s apprenticeship program regardless of 
the State‟s involvement with a particular construction project.  
As the Fifth Circuit recently observed, “a state cannot 
regulate others in the market in which it participates; the 
[market participant] doctrine only protects the state‟s 
30 
 
participation itself.”  United Healthcare, 602 F.3d at 625.  
Here, DDOL‟s involvement with the market extends beyond 
state participation. 
 
Several cases addressing comparable prevailing wage 
laws of other states bolster this conclusion.  In addressing the 
Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act, 43 PA. CONST. STAT. § 
165-1 et seq. (2009), we previously observed in the 
preemption context that Pennsylvania was “clearly acting 
with an „interest in setting policy,‟ not as a proprietor,” in 
enacting and applying the statute.  Keystone Chapter, Assoc. 
Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945, 955 n.15 
(3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 229).  
“The Prevailing Wage Act aims to ensure that workers 
receive adequate wages, a governmental objective.”  Id.  
Accordingly, it “would be difficult for the state to claim it is 
acting as a private market participant when it is making rules 
that raise the cost of its contracts.”  Id.  We concluded in that 
decision that the state‟s interest in establishing labor 
standards and wages constituted an exercise of the State‟s 
traditional police power, not market participation.  Id. 
 
In an analogous decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
the payment of prevailing wages pursuant to California‟s 
apprenticeship regulations, observing: 
 
The State did not merely create apprenticeship 
standards in its contract with [Plaintiff] nor 
were the apprenticeship standards in this case 
created based upon unique needs that the 
detention facility project presented.  The 
apprentice prevailing wage law applies 
uniformly to all public works contracts executed 
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in the State of California and is a mechanism 
through which the State regulates 
apprenticeship programs and the 
employment of apprentices on public works 
projects.  As this court has stated previously:  
“The state‟s involvement does not end with the 
awarding of the contract.  Section 1777.5 is 
aimed at regulating contractors who work on 
public contracts.” 
 
Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 190 F.3d 
1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added).  Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found the 
apprenticeship prevailing wage law to constitute “state 
regulation” of public works projects, rather than market 
participation.  Id. 
 
As in the latter cases, identical governmental 
objectives underlie the enactment of the Delaware Prevailing 
Wage regulations here.  See 19-1000-1101 DEL. ADMIN. 
CODE § 1.2 (“The purpose of this chapter is to set forth labor 
standards to safeguard the welfare of Apprentices . . . .”); id. § 
2.1.2 (“Provide for the establishment and furtherance of 
Standards of Apprenticeship and Training to safeguard the 
welfare of Apprentices and trainees.”).  As in Dillingham, 
Delaware‟s permanent place of business requirement was not 
enacted for purposes of a specific project or to service unique 
needs; as in Keystone, the instant regime raises the cost of the 
State‟s contracts with the primary purpose of advancing the 
State‟s interest in improving apprentice working conditions 
on all contracts.  See Dillingham, 190 F.3d at 1038; Keystone, 
37 F.3d at 955 n.15.  Moreover, the regulations diverge from 
the Supreme Court‟s most recent pronouncement that funding 
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conditions in procurement agreements should be “specifically 
tailored to one particular job” to qualify as market 
participation.  Brown, 554 U.S. at 70; see also Hotel Empls., 
390 F.3d at 215-16 (same).  Here, the “legislative purpose is 
not the efficient procurement of goods and services, but the 
furtherance of a labor policy,” namely, the setting of 
standards for training and payment of apprentices in public 
and private contracts alike.
26
  See Brown, 554 U.S. at 70.   
 
Another factor distinguishes the instant statutory 
regime from those that reflect mere market participation by 
private actors:  the potential civil penalty threatened by the 
State for failure to comply with the prevailing wage 
conditions.  The Delaware Code provides that “any employer 
who knowingly fails [ ] to pay the prevailing wage rates 
provided for under this section . . . shall, for each such 
violation, be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 
nor more than $5,000 for each violation.”  29 DEL. C. § 
6960(e).  Additionally, as the District Court noted, the PWL 
grants DDOL the right to revoke “the ability of a penalized 
employer to bid on future public construction contracts.”  Id.  
In this instance, DDOL directly threatened Tri-M with a 
forthcoming civil penalty for failure to conform its 
reimbursement of non-Delaware-registered apprentices to the 
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 DDOL‟s separate argument that Tri-M is ineligible for 
Delaware sponsor registration because it “voluntarily chose[ ] 
not to subject [its] apprenticeship program to DDOL 
oversight and regulation” further confirms that DDOL‟s role 
in enforcing the apprenticeship standards extends beyond 
participation in a discrete procurement contract, and entails 
regulation of a contractor‟s entire apprenticeship program.  
(See Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 29.) 
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ATRR prevailing wages.  (See App‟x at 451 (May 9, 2006 
Letter from Nelson to Tri-M).) 
 
“A governmental entity acts as a market regulator 
when it employs tools in pursuit of compliance that no private 
actor could wield, such as the threat of civil fines . . . .”  
United Haulers, 438 F.3d at 157 (citing SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 
513) (emphasis added).  In addressing the “regulator/market-
participant distinction,” we have noted with approval a Ninth 
Circuit decision that found, inter alia, the inclusion of a civil 
penalties provision in a state statute as indicative that the 
section constituted a regulatory measure outside the bounds 
of the market participant exception.   Hotel Empls., 390 F.3d 
at 215 (discussing United States v. Lockyer, 364 F.3d 1154, 
1163 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Incorp. Vil. of Rockville 
Centre v. Town of Hempstead, 196 F.3d 395, 399 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“[W]hen the state avails itself of the unique powers or 
special leverage it enjoys by virtue of its status as sovereign, 
it is „engaging in market regulation.‟”) (citation omitted).  
Where the state relies on its coercive power to effectuate 
compliance with contractual provisions, it distinguishes itself 
from a truly private actor, which must rely on contractual 
remedies to remedy breaches.  Correspondingly, Delaware‟s 
ability to impose civil penalties upon out-of-state contractors 
for failure to pay the higher mechanic prevailing wage to 
unregistered apprentices confirms that its role is not merely 
that of a market participant. 
 
Finally, we are guided by the Supreme Court‟s recent 
reminder of a central theme running through its market 
participation jurisprudence; one that is noticeably absent here: 
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In each of the [market participation] cases the 
commercial activities by the governments and 
their regulatory efforts complemented each 
other in some way, and in each of them the fact 
of tying the regulation to the public object of 
the foray into the market was understood to give 
the regulation a civic objective different from 
the discrimination traditionally held to be 
unlawful: in the paradigm of unconstitutional 
discrimination the law chills interstate activity 
by creating a commercial advantage for 
goods or services marketed by local private 
actors, not by governments and those they 
employ to fulfill their civic objectives. 
 
Davis, 553 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added).  Unlike the 
important civic considerations that animated the 
governmental favoritism in other cases – unemployment and 
disenfranchisement in White, limited natural resources in 
Reeves, or environmental pollution in Alexandria Scrap – 
DDOL‟s “civic objective” in crafting the permanent place of 
business requirement here was protectionist – or retaliatory – 
in nature.  See infra; see also Tri-M Group, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 
345-46 (summarizing testimonial evidence showing that 
Delaware‟s permanent place of business requirement was 
enacted to retaliate against Pennsylvania for failing to 
recognize Delaware-registered apprentices).  Indeed, the 
regulatory scheme here appears to fall “within the forbidden 
paradigm” precisely because the state‟s participation creates 
“a commercial advantage for goods or services marketed by 
local private actors.”  Davis, 553 U.S. at 348. 
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 Despite its legitimate and considerable investment in 
procurement, DDOL acted as a market regulator in 
promulgating expansive labor regulations that control 
apprenticeship training and wage scales for all apprenticeship 
program sponsors, regardless of the State‟s direct 
participation in the market.  Accordingly, the PWL and 
ATRR are subject to review for potentially imposing an 
undue burden on interstate commerce in contravention of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  See White, 460 U.S. at 210. 
 
II.  Dormant Commerce Clause Review 
 
 The dormant Commerce Clause “prohibits the states 
from imposing restrictions that benefit in-state economic 
interests at out-of-state interests‟ expense, thus reinforcing 
„the principle of the unitary national market.‟”  Cloverland-
Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 
201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Cloverland I”) (quoting West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1994)).
27
  
States “cannot impede free market forces to shield in-state 
businesses from out-of-state competition,” and, notably, 
“state laws that discriminate against out-of-state businesses 
by forcing them to „surrender whatever competitive 
advantages they may possess‟ are especially suspect.”  
Cloverland I, 298 F.3d at 210 (quoting Brown-Forman 
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
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See also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (“This mandate 
„reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that . . . in order to 
succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies 
toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations 
among the Colonies and later among the States under the 
Articles of Confederation.”). 
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573, 580 (1986)). 
 
To decide that Delaware‟s permanent place of business 
requirement violates the dormant Commerce Clause, we must 
first assess “whether the state regulation at issue discriminates 
against interstate commerce „either on its face or in practical 
effect.‟”  Id. (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 
(1986)); see also Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. Whitman, 437 
F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he level of scrutiny to be 
applied . . . is contingent upon whether the court finds that the 
statute or regulation is discriminatory”).28  Where a regulation 
discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local 
business, such protectionism “is per se invalid, save in a 
narrow class of cases in which the [State] can demonstrate, 
under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance 
a legitimate local interest.”  Cloverland I, 298 F.3d at 211; 
see also Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk 
Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249, 262 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Cloverland II”) 
(“Any statute that discriminates against interstate commerce 
on its face or in effect is thus subject to heightened scrutiny”) 
(quotations and citation omitted).   
 
If, however, the state regulation is not discriminatory 
and “regulates even-handedly” with merely “incidental” 
burdens upon interstate commerce, it is subject to a 
“balancing test whereby the statute must be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on interstate commerce is „clearly excessive 
                                              
28
 Statutes that discriminate by “practical effect and design,” 
rather than explicitly on the face of the regulation, are 
similarly subjected to heightened scrutiny.  Am. Trucking, 437 
F.3d at 319 n.2 (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994)). 
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in relation to the putative local benefits.‟”  Cloverland I, 298 
F.3d at 211 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 297 U.S. 
137, 142 (1970)); Davis, 553 U.S. at 339 (same). 
 
Here, the District Court found Delaware‟s statutory 
scheme to be discriminatory on its face, and we are not 
persuaded otherwise.  DDOL contends repeatedly throughout 
its briefing that the regulatory regime is not discriminatory 
since it applies to all program sponsors regardless of state 
residency.  Yet the District Court correctly observed that the 
ATRR “contain an express in-state presence requirement:  a 
„registrant‟ sponsor must „regularly maintain[ ] a place of 
business in Delaware‟ that is not a site trailer, temporary 
structure, or post office box.”  Tri-M Group, 705 F. Supp. 2d 
at 344 (quoting 19-1000-1101 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1).  
Without establishing this in-state presence, an out-of-state 
contractor cannot become a registered sponsor of Delaware-
registered apprentices, and is required to reimburse all 
employed apprentices at the higher mechanic‟s rate.  See 19-
1000-1101 DEL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 6.2.6 & 6.2.7.  As such, the 
regulations on their face restrict sponsor registration – and the 
concomitant lower wages pertaining thereto – to in-state 
contractors or those possessing a permanent place of business 
in Delaware.  This statutory scheme forces out-of-state 
contractors such as Tri-M to “surrender whatever competitive 
advantages they may possess” by burdening them with 
expenditures for a new local operation, or with the payment 
of increased wages on their contracts, thereby increasing their 
costs and decreasing their ability to submit competitive bids 
for projects.   
 
Our conclusion here is informed by the Supreme 
Court‟s reasoning in Granholm, which rejected a New York 
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state law requiring out-of-state wineries to establish a branch 
factory, office, or storeroom in the state in order to ship wine 
directly to New York consumers.  544 U.S. at 470.  At the 
same time, in-state wineries received the same shipping 
privileges simply by applying for a license.  Id.  Finding that 
the extra step of establishing an office for out-of-state 
wineries “[drove] up the cost of their wine,” the Supreme 
Court found New York‟s “in-state presence requirement” 
discriminatory and applied heightened scrutiny, noting that 
such discrimination “runs contrary to our admonition that 
States cannot require an out-of-state firm „to become a 
resident in order to compete on equal terms.‟”  Id. at 474-75 
(quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 
U.S. 64, 72 (1963)).  Echoing this holding, we subsequently 
noted that “statutes that increase out-of-state competitors‟ 
costs are subject to heightened scrutiny under the Commerce 
Clause.”  Am. Trucking, 437 F.3d at 322. 
 
The instant regulations explicitly treat in-state and out-
of-state economic interests differently by compelling out-of-
state contractors “to become [ ] resident[s] in order to 
compete on equal terms.”  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474-75.  
Contrary to DDOL‟s misleading assertion that Tri-M 
voluntarily chose not to subject its apprenticeship program to 
DDOL oversight and regulation, Tri-M‟s purported “choice” 
in the matter would entail an assumption of costs not imposed 
upon in-state contractors.  Accordingly, the regulations 
effectuate a protectionist bias against out-of-state contractors 
and are subject to heightened scrutiny.
29
 
                                              
29
 Even were we to find the disputed regulations not facially 
discriminatory, we would nevertheless conclude that the 
regulations discriminate in effect by requiring out-of-state 
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 Once the party challenging the statute meets its burden 
of showing discriminatory design or effect, the burden shifts 
to the State to demonstrate “„1) that the statute serves a 
legitimate local interest, and 2) that this purpose could not be 
served as well by available non-discriminatory means.‟”  
Freeman v. Corzine, -- 629 F.3d 146,158 (3d Cir. Dec. 17, 
2010) (quoting Am. Trucking, 437 F.3d at 319).  Moreover, 
the “absence of evidence is dispositive, because „[t]he burden 
is on the State to show that the discrimination is demonstrably 
justified,‟ and we may „[u]phold state regulations that 
discriminate against interstate commerce only after finding, 
based on concrete record evidence, that a state‟s 
nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable.‟”  Id. 
at 161 (quoting Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492-93) (emphasis and 
alterations in original).   
 
DDOL contends that it has a legitimate interest in 
safeguarding the safety and welfare of all apprentices by 
requiring a permanent place of business in Delaware, and that 
it lacks the resources to effectively monitor out-of-state 
apprenticeship programs for compliance with the Delaware 
standards.  Its position is belied, however, by the State‟s 
conduct in this case, as well as the evidentiary history of the 
regulations at issue.  The evidence and testimony adduced by 
the parties demonstrated the retaliatory motivations 
underlying the amendment of the Delaware regulations in 
1999 to include the permanent place of business requirement.  
Prior to that time, the disputed regulations contained no such 
                                                                                                     
contractors to pay higher mechanic‟s wage rates to registered 
apprentices merely because the registering contractor lacks a 
permanent place of business in Delaware. 
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residency condition, and Tri-M was a registered apprentice 
sponsor in Delaware.  (App‟x at A493-494.)  As the District 
Court discussed, the State added the discriminatory residency 
requirement to the regulatory regime in response to similar 
legislative enactments by Pennsylvania and Maryland.  Tri-M 
Group, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 346.  Rather than advancing the 
legitimate state interest in improving apprentice labor and 
wage conditions, this amendment primarily reflected an 
intransigent “contest of wills over apprentice recognition” 
between neighboring states.  Id.     
 
 Moreover, as the District Court concluded, the 
demonstrated existence of non-discriminatory alternatives for 
ensuring the safety and training of apprentices did not 
overcome the per se invalidity presumption applicable to 
discriminatory regulations.  Tri-M‟s lack of a permanent 
place of business in Delaware did not prevent DDOL from 
conducting a thorough investigation to ensure Tri-M‟s 
compliance with the PWL and ATRR.  See id. (“In essence, 
defendant argues that the DDOL cannot take out-of-state 
companies at their word, but did exactly that with respect to 
its investigation of plaintiff.”).  Indeed, other than a few 
conclusory statements to that effect, DDOL advanced no 
evidence to support its contention that monitoring out-of-state 
contractors working on in-state public projects is any more 
difficult than for in-state contractors, much less that such 
oversight is “unworkable,” as Granholm requires.  See 544 
U.S. at 493.  Indeed, we find the record devoid of evidence to 
substantiate DDOL‟s assertion that it could not verify out-of-
state work standards through postal or electronic transmission 
of “certified payrolls, tax records, or other documentation as 
compared to a personal inspection of the apprentice‟s out-of-
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state work job site.”  See Tri-M Group, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 
346.   
 
The “Commerce Clause cases demand more than mere 
speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state 
[interests].”  Granholm, 544 U.S. at 492.  DDOL‟s vague and 
unsubstantiated justifications for the discriminatory 
regulations failed to clear this hurdle, and we can discern no 
evidence confirming that the permanent place of business 
requirement actually advances legitimate interests or that 
“nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable.”30  
See Freeman, -- F.3d --, 2010 WL 5129219, at *9.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the disputed regulations do not 
withstand heightened scrutiny and violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  
 
III.  Congressional Authorization of the Discriminatory 
Regulatory Scheme 
 
 Finally, we consider DDOL‟s argument that Congress 
and the United States Department of Labor (“USDOL”) 
expressly approved the challenged state regulation, thus 
removing any objection under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.  The District Court rejected this argument, finding 
DDOL‟s “assertion that Congress‟s empowerment of the 
USDOL with „regulatory power‟ somehow nullifies the 
dormant commerce clause issue presented in this case is, at a 
                                              
30
 While DDOL could have potentially satisfied its burden by 
demonstrating that the pre-1999 regulatory framework – 
which did not mandate a permanent in-state present for out-
of-state contractors – was unworkable, it adduced no 
argument or concrete evidence to support this position. 
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minimum, not compelling.”  Tri-M Group, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 
343.  We agree. 
 
 It is well established that “Congress can authorize 
states to impose restrictions that the dormant Commerce 
Clause would otherwise forbid.”  Cloverland I, 298 F.3d at 
210 n.13; see also Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 
1294, 1304 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Congress may consent to state 
regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce.”) 
(citation omitted).  “When Congress so chooses, state actions 
which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional 
attack” since Congress‟s commerce power in such instances 
is “not dormant, but has been exercised by that body.”  
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Gov’rs of Fed. Res. Sys., 
472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985); see also Life Partners, Inc. v. 
Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 291 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Congress 
holds the authority to „redefine the distribution of power over 
interstate commerce‟ by „permit[ting] the states to regulate 
the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be 
permissible.‟”) (quoting So. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 
761, 769 (1945)).   
 
Importantly, however, congressional consent must be 
express, and is only evidenced “where Congress has 
„affirmatively contemplate[d] otherwise invalid state 
legislation,‟ and „[w]here state or local government action is 
specifically authorized by Congress.‟”  Norfolk So. Corp. v. 
Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal citations 
omitted).  “Because of the important role the Commerce 
Clause plays in protecting the free flow of interstate trade, 
[the Supreme] Court has exempted state statutes from the 
implied limitations of the Clause only when the congressional 
direction to do so has been „unmistakably clear.‟”  Maine, 
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477 U.S. at 138-39 (quoting Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 91); see 
also Arab African Intern. Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168, 172-
73 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Congress must manifest its unambiguous 
intent before a federal statute will be read to permit or 
approve . . . a violation of the Commerce Clause.”) (quoting 
Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 458).  Moreover, the state has the 
“burden of demonstrating a clear and unambiguous intent on 
behalf of Congress to permit the discrimination against 
interstate commerce.”  Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 458. 
 
 DDOL presents the Fitzgerald Act, 29 U.S.C. § 50 et 
seq., as reflecting Congress‟s intent to remove from 
Commerce Clause scrutiny State regulations implemented 
pursuant to the Act, including the discriminatory regulations 
at issue here.  The Act authorized and directed the Secretary 
of Labor “to formulate and promote the furtherance of labor 
standards necessary to safeguard the welfare of apprentices . . 
. [and] to cooperate with State agencies engaged in the 
formulation and promotion of standards of apprenticeship.”  
29 U.S.C. § 50.  The implementing regulations provide “a 
detailed regulatory scheme defining apprenticeship programs 
and their requirements, and establish a review, approval, and 
registration process for proposed apprenticeship programs 
administered by State Apprenticeship Councils under the 
aegis of the United States Department of Labor.”  
Hydrostorage, Inc. v. N. Cal. Boilermakers Local Joint 
Apprenticeship Comm., 891 F.2d 719, 731 (9th Cir. 1989), 
abrogated in part on other grounds as stated in Engine Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Maintenance Dist., 498 F.3d 
1031, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007).
31
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 Pursuant to the pertinent regulations, the Department of 
Labor may “recognize” a State Apprenticeship Agency, 
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While DDOL is correct that the Fitzgerald Act 
provides for state regulation of apprenticeship standards and 
authorizes the Department of Labor to cooperate with state 
agencies in their regulation of apprenticeship programs, 
DDOL failed to establish that the Act and the implementing 
regulations expressly authorized the states to enact 
apprenticeship regulations that discriminate against out-of-
state interests, let alone in an “unmistakably clear” manner.  
DDOL references several of the implementing regulations, 
each of which “relate only to eligibility for federal 
registration.”  See Hydrostorage, 891 F.2d at 731; see also 
Assoc. Bldrs. & Contractors v. Perry, 817 F. Supp. 49, 53 
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (same).  Notably, none of the referenced 
regulations clearly and unambiguously manifests Congress‟s 
intent to empower the State to discriminate against interstate 
commerce; the same may be said of the Act itself.   
 
In fact, a comparison of the cases relied upon by 
DDOL is instructive.  In Norfolk Southern Corporation v. 
Oberly, the district court examined whether developmental 
                                                                                                     
which confers upon that agency the “non-exclusive authority 
to determine whether an apprenticeship program conforms to 
the published standards.”  29 C.F.R. § 29.13.  To be 
recognized, the state agency “must submit a State 
apprenticeship law . . . that conforms to the requirements of 
29 CFR parts 29 and 30,” which must include, inter alia, “a 
description of the basic standards, criteria, and requirements 
for program registration and/or approval,” as well as “a 
description of policies and operating procedures which depart 
from or impose requirements in addition to those prescribed 
in this part.”  Id. 
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restrictions in the Delaware Coastal Zone Act were 
specifically authorized under the federal Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S. § 1454 et seq.  632 F. 
Supp. 1225, 1245 (D. Del. 1986).  After careful review, the 
court found that “Congress deliberately and repeatedly spoke 
of „choices‟ to be made by the states,” and expressly 
committed to the states the power “to resolve choices among 
competing uses in a manner that might otherwise be subject 
to Commerce Clause challenge.”  Id. at 1248.   
 
Similarly, in Prudential Insurance Company v. 
Benjamin, in the context of the McCarron Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1011 et seq., the Supreme Court observed that Congress 
“intended to declare, and in effect declared, that uniformity of 
regulation, and of state taxation, are not required in reference 
to the business of insurance.”  328 U.S. 408, 431 (1946).  
Finding Congress‟s determination that “state taxes, which in 
[Congress‟s] silence might be held invalid as discriminatory, 
do not place on interstate insurance business a burden which 
it is unable generally to bear,” the Court concluded that 
rejection of a state tax “would flout the expressly declared 
policies of both Congress and the state.”  Id. at 431, 433.  
Finally, DDOL‟s citation to White is also inapposite, for in 
that instance, “the federal regulations for each program 
affirmatively permit[ted] the type of parochial favoritism 
expressed in the order.”  460 U.S. at 213 (noting that the 
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 required that 
“opportunities for training and employment be given to 
lower-income residents of the project area”). 
 
This jurisprudence makes clear that courts will find 
congressional authorization to discriminate against interstate 
commerce only where such behavior is clearly and 
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affirmatively contemplated by Congress, and expressly 
authorized in the statutory language.  See Oberly, 822 F.2d at 
393.  The regulatory language defining eligibility for 
apprenticeship program registration that DDOL relies upon 
does not manifest in an unmistakably clear manner that 
Congress expressly envisioned or authorized a state to 
exercise its cooperative apprenticeship regulatory power to 
discriminate in favor of in-state parties. 
 
Accordingly, we reject DDOL‟s argument that the 
United States Secretary of Labor‟s recognition of the 
Delaware apprenticeship agency as conforming with the 
pertinent implementing regulations immunizes the regulation 
in dispute from dormant Commerce Clause review.  Only 
“Congress may authorize the States to engage in regulation 
that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid.”  Maine, 
477 U.S. at 138.  The Fitzgerald Act did not explicitly endow 
the Secretary with authority to permit discrimination against 
interstate commerce, and DDOL provided no other basis to 
conclude that discriminatory regulation may be authorized by 
a federal agency. 
 
 Because Congress did not authorize the discrimination 
at issue, DDOL‟s regulatory scheme constitutes 
impermissible discrimination under the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s grant of summary judgment in this matter. 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring, 
 I concur in the result in this case.  Unlike my 
colleagues, I would hold that the Delaware Department of 
Labor (DDOL) forfeited its right to argue on appeal that 
Delaware acted as a market participant because it failed to 
raise that argument in the District Court.  
I 
 DDOL provides no explanation for its failure to raise 
the market participant exception to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause in the District Court.  Nevertheless, the Majority 
reaches this issue because the appeal “implicates significant 
issues of state sovereignty” and “raises a pure question of 
law.”  True as these conclusions are, they do not constitute 
“exceptional circumstances” necessary to overcome DDOL‟s 
forfeiture of a significant argument that it could have and 
should have made in the District Court.
1
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 The parties describe Delaware‟s failure to raise the 
market participant exception as a “waiver.”  As the Supreme 
Court has explained, “[w]aiver is different from forfeiture. 
Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion 
of a right, waiver is the „intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right.‟”  United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 464 (1938)).  Under this definition, Delaware‟s failure to 
raise this issue in the District Court is more properly 
characterized as a “forfeiture” than as a “waiver.”   
 
2 
 
 At issue in this appeal are some $10,000 in wages Tri-
M paid to six apprentices who worked on a state-sponsored 
construction project.  The project has been completed, so all 
that remains for adjudication is who must pay this relatively 
modest sum.  In my view, this has little or no effect on the 
public interest and, regardless of which side prevails, cannot 
rise to the level of “manifest injustice.”  Accordingly, I would 
not excuse DDOL‟s forfeiture. 
 If we adhere to our forfeiture doctrine in this appeal, 
the constitutionality of the Delaware Prevailing Wage Law 
can be litigated in the next case and DDOL may, if it chooses, 
raise the market participant exception at that time.  If the 
issue were joined and fully litigated in the District Court, we 
would have the benefit of a complete record and a reasoned 
decision by a trial judge.
2
  Moreover, as the Majority rightly 
notes, litigants in thirty-seven other states would be free to 
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  Although the Majority states that “we are confronted 
solely with a pure question of law,” Maj. Op. at 16-17, the 
opinion relies, to a large extent, on factual determinations 
regarding the scope of Delaware‟s regulatory scheme.  For 
instance, the Majority finds that Delaware‟s apprenticeship 
wage and training regulations “are not limited to public works 
projects,” because they apply, on their face, to any Delaware-
registered apprentice sponsor operating in the State.  The 
record does not reflect, however, whether the State actively 
regulates non-public-works projects or whether companies 
may opt out of the program once their contractual obligations 
to the State are complete.  These are precisely the types of 
factual questions we expect a trial court to find, and our task 
would be made clearer if we allowed the District Court to do 
so in this case. 
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challenge regulations granting similar benefits to in-state 
companies.  Maj. Op. at 13.  As a result, district courts 
throughout the country would have the opportunity to review 
the constitutionality of a wide array of state procurement 
statutes, and in so doing provide appellate courts with a 
deeper understanding of this unsettled area of the law.
3
  Cf. 
Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005) (deciding 
the merits of a forfeited claim where the “proper resolution of 
the legal question, though not exactly simple, [wa]s 
reasonably certain”).   
I agree with the Majority that in some cases “the 
public interest is better served by addressing [an issue] than 
by ignoring it.”  Maj. Op. at 15-16 (citing Barefoot Architect, 
Inc. v. Bunge, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 121698, at *10 (3d Cir. 
Jan. 14, 2011).  For instance, in United States v. Bagot, 398 
F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2005), we exercised our discretion to 
review a deportee‟s claim after finding that “failing to 
consider Bagot‟s arguments would result in the substantial 
injustice of deporting an American citizen.”  Id. at 256.   
Similarly, in United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 202 n.4 
(3d Cir. 2010), we held that, at least where the “public 
reputation of judicial proceedings” is at stake, we have an 
“institutional” interest in resolving unsettled questions 
regarding a defendant‟s trial rights.  Id. at 202 n.4.  Finally, in 
Bunge, we held that inadvertent mistakes, such as a party‟s 
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 As the Majority notes, “application of the distinction 
between „market participant‟ and „market regulator‟ has [] 
occasioned considerable dispute in the Supreme Court‟s 
jurisprudence,” Maj. Op. at 26 n.24, and our own 
jurisprudence “reflects limited opportunity to opine regarding 
the exception,” id. at 21. 
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invocation of “the wrong definition of the tort,” does not 
necessarily trigger the application of the waiver doctrine.  
2011 WL 121698, at *10. 
Unlike in Bagot, here I see no exigency that 
necessitates a prompt resolution of the market participant 
issue.  Indeed, as noted above, a trial court‟s thorough 
analysis of the legal and factual questions raised on appeal 
would be tremendously helpful in deciding this difficult issue.  
Moreover, the “institutional” interest in resolving this issue is 
minimal.  There is no evidence that lower courts are reaching 
inconsistent results or that states are responding to the legal 
uncertainty by halting enforcement or repealing regulations 
that may be discriminatory.  The fact that the issue is one of 
constitutional import does not alone transform it into a matter 
of public importance, as we have enforced waivers in 
weightier circumstances, including those affecting 
constitutional rights.  See e.g., United States v. Lockett, 406 
F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant waived 
his legal argument for “limited consent” under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments by failing to raise it before the 
district court); Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 418 (3d Cir. 
2003) (finding that defendant waived his legal argument for 
relief under the Petition Clause). 
Finally, there is no evidence in this record to suggest 
that Delaware‟s failure to raise the market participant issue 
was inadvertent.  Cf. Bunge, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 121698, at 
*10.  Indeed, given that the market participant doctrine has 
long been a recognized exception to the dormant Commerce 
Clause, it is unlikely that counsel for DDOL simply missed 
the issue.  The DDOL could just as plausibly have decided to 
pursue an alternative theory after evaluating the relative 
merits of the arguments.  See United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d 
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79, 86 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Th[e] „raise-or-waive rule‟ prevents 
sandbagging; for instance, it precludes a party from making a 
tactical decision to refrain from objecting, and subsequently, 
should the case turn sour, assigning error.”) (citation omitted).  
Just as private litigants may not “jump from theory to theory 
like a bee buzzing from flower to flower,” United States v. 
Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations and 
quotations marks omitted), a state should not be permitted to 
do so in the absence of truly exceptional circumstances. 
For these reasons, I concur in the Court‟s judgment. 
